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ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN CHINA
Yuwa Wei
I. INTRODUCTION
After years of deliberation, the first Chinese law endorsing as-
set-backed securitization was finally enacted in 2005.' In the same
year, the State Council of the People's Republic of China approved two
pilot projects organized by the China Construction Bank and the
China Development Bank.2 The Chinese investors have given the two
projects their full endorsement by over-subscribing for the project
bonds.' Before the two pilot projects' launch, agreements on coopera-
tive schemes for securitization businesses were negotiated between
Chinese banks and foreign financial institutions.4 Subsequently, Mac-
quarie Bank of Australia received approval to be the first foreign bank
to provide securitization services in China.5 All signs connote the in-
troduction of a new reform mechanism, and the dawn of a new phase of
economic reforms.
The economic reforms in China are at a critical stage. The en-
terprise reforms have led to the corporatization of previously state-
owned enterprises. Most of the newly corporatized enterprises are
state-owned or state-controlled companies. These companies have re-
tained their affiliation with the state.
Before the economic reforms, state banks extended a large pro-
portion of "policy loans" to state-owned enterprises and constantly un-
derwrote loss-making enterprises.6  Consequently, banks were
distressed by non-performance loans.7 One of the goals of corporatizing
China's state-owned enterprises - to lessen the burden endured by
banks - is a result of being the sole financier of industrial firms. How-
1 On 20 April 2005, the People's Bank of China and China Banking Regulatory
Commission promulgated the Administrative Measures on Pilot Projects of Credit
Assets Securitisation.
2 See Pacuike Kaiyi, Developing China's Financial Market Through Negotiable Se-
curities, HEXUN, Aug. 3, 2006, available at http://money.hexun.com/1937176275
4A.shtml.
3 Id.
4 See YANRONG HONG, STUDIES OF LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIZATION 234 (2004).
5 Macquarie Bank registered the first wholly foreign-owned enterprise dealing
with securitization business in China in 2002. See id.
6 See YuwA WEI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE
99-100 (2003).
7 Id.
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ever, the corporatization has not improved the state banks' ability to
withstand bad loans. Currently, an overwhelming proportion of bank
loans still go to state-owned or state-controlled companies with the
perception that a considerable amount of the loans are to be non-per-
forming debts.' Given the key role of the banking sector in China's
economy, finding a reform strategy to reduce the pressure on the
banks is a priority. Consequently, asset-backed securitization has been
introduced as a new mechanism to combat the bad loan problem plagu-
ing China's banking sector.9 However, a positive outcome from the new
reforms is not guaranteed. Securitization involves complex procedures,
and requires significant policy support and an efficient legal
framework.
This article examines the law and practice of asset-backed
securitization in China. The discussion will be developed in three
parts. The first part investigates the nature of asset-backed securitiza-
tion and its utility. There is a lack of incentives for Chinese banks to
promote securitization. Currently, securitization in China is primarily
motivated by the desire to eliminate non-performing loans. 10 The sec-
ond part of this article will analyze China's legal framework for securi-
tization. Although the enactment of the Administrative Measures on
Pilot Projects of Credit Assets Securitisation (Measures) has brought a
legal regime of securitization into existence, the law regulating securi-
tization is far from adequate and efficient. Reforms that adjust and
coordinate laws and regulations in the areas of trust, insolvency, ac-
counting, and taxation are anticipated. The final part of this article
will address what may be done to ensure the securitization program
will resolve China's current and future challenges, and the extent that
securitization will impact the reform progress of China's banking
sectors.
II. ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION
Asset-backed securitization is the financial technique of con-
verting non-liquid assets into instruments that can be traded freely in
the capital market." The process involves the creation of a pool of non-
8 See Johnny P. Chen, Non-Performing Loan Securitization in the People's Repub-
lic of China 29 (May 2004) (unpublished Honors Thesis, Stanford University),
available at http://www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/HonorsTheses/Theses_
2004/Chen.pdf.
9 Xinhua News Press Editor, China Will Launch Pilot Asset Backed Securitization
Projects to Handle Non-Performing Loan Problems, available at http://www.cyol.
net.
10 See HONG, supra note 4, at 223.
11 See Joseph C. Schenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution,
Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1369, 1374-1375 (1991).
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liquid financial assets and the sale of the assets to a specially created
investment vehicle. The investment vehicle then issues bonds backed
by the assets in the financial market. 12 The investors of such bonds get
a regular interest payment during the life of the bonds plus repayment
of the full face value of the bonds. The difference between unsecuri-
tized bonds and securitized bonds is that the payments of interest and
principal of unsecuritized bonds depends on the financial health or in-
solvency of the company that has issued the bonds, while payments
from securitized bonds depend on the cash flow generated by the asset
pool. 13
Securitization is a less expensive method of raising funds than
other fund raising schemes. A common practice used to attract inves-
tors is to enhance the credit of securitized securities. Credit enhance-
ment can be achieved both internally and externally by subordinating
one or more classes of assets, or by obtaining a letter of credit or a
surety bond from a financial institution.14
The earliest species of asset-backed securitization was mort-
gage-backed securitization, initiated by U.S. banks in the 1970s.1 5 At
the time, the United States required banks to extend a certain per-
centage of mortgage loans.16 The long-term nature of mortgage loans
placed banks under liquidity pressure. To ease the pressure, the U.S.
government established the Government National Mortgage Associa-
tion (GNMA) to develop and improve asset-backed securitization. In
1970, GNMA issued the first bonds under the scheme of asset-backed
securitization. 17 In doing so, banks immediately realized the cash
value of non-liquid mortgage loan contracts.
After initial success, the practice of asset-backed securitization
developed rapidly to include many other types of financial assets, such
as credit card payments, trade receivables, leases, auto loans and stu-
12 See JOHN DEACON, SECURITIZATION: PRINCIPLES, MARKETS AND TERMS 2 (1998).
13 See Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit: Hearing on
Protecting Homeowners Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity,
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, of the H.R., 108th Cong. 4 (2003)
(statement of Cameron L. Cowan, Partner, American Securitization Forum), avail-
able at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/110503cc.pdf.
14 Id.
15 See JOSEPH Hu, BASICS OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 15-16 (1997); Sunil
Gangwani, Securitization 101, 3 SPEAKING OF SECURITIZATION: ACCOUNTING, TAX,
REGULATORY AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 4-1 (1998), available at http://www.vinodkothari.com/
gangwan2.pdf.
16 See BAOZHONG GAO, INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ASSET SECURITIZATION IN
CHINA 41 (2005).
17 Id. at 42.
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dent loans."8 Wall Street's philosophy, regarding asset-backed securi-
ties, is that any asset with a stable revenue stream is capable of being
securitized. 19 "By the end of September 2004, the balance of American
asset-backed securities reached 7.2 trillion U.S. dollars, accounting for
31% of the balance of American bond market."2 °
The perceived benefits of asset-backed securitization include:
(1) supporting public policy objectives such as broad
home ownership and the development of financial mar-
kets, especially capital and mortgage markets; (2) ad-
dressing regulatory requirements for financial
institutions, especially capital adequacy and lending
limit requirements applicable to banks; (3) transferring
risk, especially in the context of non-performing assets
and portfolio diversification; and (4) providing finance. 2 '
In addition, asset-backed securitization is an efficient method of in-
creasing the liquidity of banks and accelerating the turnover of credit
funds. Furthermore, it enables companies to isolate a high risk project
by establishing a special purpose enterprise to transfer risks to a wide
range of investors.
Following the example of the U.S., many mature market econo-
mies have embraced the practice of securitization.2 2 In recent years,
securitization has also been utilized in many emerging markets. These
countries have endeavored to foster a favorable economic and legal en-
vironment for their securitization practice. Their experiences serve as
inspiration for China in designing and developing its own legal and
economic framework for securitization. China, however, has its own
special needs and agenda in introducing the concept and practice of
securitization. While asset-backed securitization has primarily been
utilized to accelerate liquidity of assets in the United States, in China,
the paramount purpose behind employing asset-backed securitization
is to rectify the non-performing loans of state banks.2 3 Securitization
therefore is a key step in the ongoing economic reforms. The success of
pilot securitization projects will open up new opportunities to reform
China's banking sector and to dispose of the non-performing loans of
18 See Chen, supra note 8, at 4.
19 See Tang Ye, Securitization of Non-Performing Loans May Not Achieve Its Pur-
pose, available at http://business.sohu.com/20061023/n245939680.shtml.
20 The People's Bank of China, PBC & CBRC Official Answers Questions on the
Administrative Rules for Pilot Securitization of Credit Assets, available at http:fl
www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6400&ID=552.
21 See Douglas Arner, Emerging Market Economies and Government Promotion of
Securitization, 12 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 505, 505-06 (2000).
22 See generally SECURITIZATION (David G. Glennie et al. eds., 1998).
23 See Ye, supra note 19.
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state-owned companies. Banks and the market play crucial roles in
China's securitization program. Two key questions must be asked:
First, to what extent are the banks motivated to promote securitiza-
tion? Second, will the banks be able to create attractive securitization
products for investors? In order to answer these questions, it is neces-
sary to analyze China's banking sector.
The People's Bank of China (PBOC) is China's central bank. It
makes and implements monetary policy, oversees the State Adminis-
tration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and formulates foreign-exchange
policies.24 The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is re-
sponsible for maintaining a safe and sound banking system in China.
It regulates and supervises banks, asset management companies,
trust and investment companies, as well as other deposit-taking finan-
cial institutions.25 Beneath the PBOC and CBRC are the so called "big
four," the four state-owned commercial banks: the Bank of China
(BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Agricultural Bank of
China (ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
(ICBC). Three policy banks exercise government'directed spending
functions: the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), the
China Development Bank (CDB), and the Export-Import Bank of
China (Chexim). These banks are responsible for financing economic
and trade developments and state-invested projects. Beneath the "big
four" are smaller state-owned commercial banks: Bank of Communica-
tion, CITIC Industrial Bank, China Everbright Bank, Hua Xia Bank,
China Minsheng Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen De-
velopment Bank, China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong develop-
ment bank, and Fujian Industrial Bank.
Years of government-directed lending resulted in the "big four"
being left with many non-performing loans. According to a PBOC re-
port, non-performing loans accounted for 21.4% to 26.1% of the total
lending of China's four big banks in 2002.26 The figure is well beyond
the ceiling specified in the New Basel Capital Accord.27 In 1999, four
asset management companies were established to transfer the non-
performing assets from the banks and to deal with these assets. About
RMB 14,000 billion non-performing loans were acquired by the four
asset management companies.2" The problem is further compounded
by the failure of the four asset management companies to make signifi-
24 The People's Bank of China, Major Responsibilities, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/
english/renhagjianjie/responsibilities.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2007).
25 See STATE COUNCIL, Administrative Law of the Banking Sector, sec. 2 (2003).
26 See GAO, supra note 16, at 155.
27 According to the standards in the document, the ceiling for defaulting loans is
below 15%. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, Consultative Docu-
ment: The New Basel Capital Accord (2003), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca03.pdf.
28 See HONG, supra note 4, at 223.
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cant progress in rectifying the non-performing loans. By the end of the
first quarter of 2003, only RMB 715.24 billon was recovered.2 9 Recov-
ering the remaining part of non-performing loans will be an even
greater challenge.
Hence, the asset management companies wish to repackage
non-performing loans into viable assets and sell them off to the inves-
tors through securitization. However, such a package is unlikely to be
attractive to investors.3 ° Many are skeptical of how successful the
scheme will be. One way to increase the attractiveness of these pack-
ages is to upgrade the credit rating of the package. In doing so, how-
ever, the benefits of securitizing the debts are likely to be offset by
increased costs on credit enhancement.
Nevertheless, the Chinese government is determined to inau-
gurate asset-backed securitization, with the disposal of the state
banks' non-performing loans as the paramount objective. The govern-
ment and the banks are quite frank about this intention. Both CBC
and CDB have clarified that the aim of launching the two pilot projects
is to improve their credibility, raise their asset sufficiency, and limit
lending risks.3 1 There is a danger that securitization in China may
become a single-functioned instrument. Its other utilities, including
accelerating asset liquidity and increasing efficiency of asset alloca-
tion, could be deemed as secondary, and consequently overlooked.3 2
Consequently, securitization in China may guided by the erroneous be-
lief that any large amount of debt is capable of being securitized.33
However, China is not the only country placing importance on the in-
troduction of securitization to curtail non-performing loans. In fact, us-
ing securitization to control non-performing loans is a popular practice
in many countries, particularly within Asia and Latin America.3 4
What distinguishes China from other countries is the fact that securi-
tization in China is expected to play an important role in assisting the
banking sector reforms. The outcome of the securitization practice will
have far reaching influence on China's economic life in the coming
years.
29 Id. at 224.
30 See also GAO, supra note 16, at 163; Xueyin Liu, Securitization is Not the Best
Medicine for Non-Performing Loans (2005), http://www.zgjrw.com/News/2005929/
Bank/918138581100.html; see generally Xude He, Securitization of Banks' Non-
Performing Loans: Some Analyses and Findings, 8 FINANCE AND TRADE COMMERCE
(2000).
31 See Ye, supra note 19.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See Sean Bulmer & Hyoung Don Kim, SECURITIZATION YEARBOOK 2000, at 29;
see also GAO, supra note 16, at 165.
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Logically speaking, in an emerging market, to boost investors'
confidence in securitized products and ensure the success of securitiza-
tion, it is desirable to first introduce some securitized bonds of low risk
and senior security. Mortgage loan business in China has been rapidly
expanding. By the end of 2004, the mortgage loans reached RMB
18,100 billion, accounting for more than 10% of the total bank loans.3 5
Mortgage loans have a stable cash flow and a high credit rating.
Securitization of mortgage loans is therefore able to provide investors
with a more attractive financial product. However, the Chinese com-
mercial banks are not very keen to securitize mortgage loans, because
mortgage loans have a low default rate, and are thus regarded as safer
loans.3" Furthermore, because investment channels available to Chi-
nese citizens are limited, most citizens elect to deposit their savings in
banks. Chinese banks are thus not under substantial liquidity pres-
sure and not particularly motivated to securitize these bundles of well-
performing loans.3" These banks are interested in retaining securi-
tized mortgage loans within their realm by selling securitized mort-
gage loans to affiliated customers who are usually large state-owned or
controlled corporations.3" In doing so, the banks are able to kill three
birds with one stone: increasing asset liquidity, limiting the costs of
securitization, and retaining large affiliated customers.3 9 The practice
reduces securitization to an exercise of exchanging benefits and shar-
ing limited risks among insiders, which in turn undermines the gov-
ernment's reform purposes.
To honor its WTO commitments, China has lifted the restric-
tions on foreign bank branches conducting full operations of both for-
eign-currency business and RMB business in the country.4 ° Chinese
banks are expected to face relentless competition from foreign banks in
the very near future. Encumbered by non-performing loans and a low
asset sufficiency rate, Chinese banks will have to operate under un-
precedented risks. Any strategic mismanagement in the banking sec-
tor will expose China's economy to disastrous instability.4 ' The
35 See Qiaoling Fu, Government Guided Mortgage Backed Securitization in the US
(2005), available at http://cn.biz.yahoo.com/061016/16/g7d.html.
36 See HONG, supra note 4, at 233; see also News Editor, Standard & Poor's Opin-
ion: Securitization in China Has Great Potential, available at http://news.xyef.
com/102006/13/542490.html.
37 Id.
38 See Ye, supra note 19.
39 Id.
40 See Michael Overmyer, With China's WTO Entry Requirements Winding
Down, Will 2006 Become China's "Year of the Bank"?, CHINA Bus. REV. ONLINE,
available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0601/overmyer.htm.
41 See Chen, Weitseng, WTO: Time's Up for Chinese Banks-China's Banking Re-
form and Non-Performing Loan Disposal, 7 Chi. J. Int'l. L. 239, 241 (2006).
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Chinese policy makers have foreseen the threat and are determined to
tackle non-performing loans on a massive scale.4 2 Unfortunately, Chi-
nese banks and state controlled companies are not so mobilized. There
is a concern that securitization may be reduced to another stopgap
measure, which will only temporarily give relief to the state banks and
state controlled companies. 43
In summary, the mechanism of securitization in China must be
adjusted to suit China's special economic reform purposes - unbur-
dening state banks on the one hand, and withstanding the lure of dis-
torted practice on the other. The result of the reforms will not be
immediately obvious. It will take time to ascertain if the new reform
strategy can satisfactorily deliver the desired outcomes.
III. CHINA'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK SUPPORTING ASSET-
BACKED SECURITIZATION
Securitization demands the backing of a sophisticated legal
framework. It involves tailoring the conventional trust law, insolvency
law, corporate law, taxation law, securities law, contract law, and ac-
counting rules to suit the specific purpose of securitization, in addition
to implementing other special laws on securitization. This is because,
although securitization has "unique functions and advantages, it also
has quite a few latent risk factors such as, liability violation, force
majeure, payment in advance, deterioration of economic conditions,
and changes of interest rates."4 4 Therefore, a legal infrastructure sus-
taining a systematic approach to risk evaluation, mortgage foreclo-
sure, compulsory insurance, credit enhancement, and insolvency
resolution, is required. Common law jurisdictions enjoy special advan-
tages due to the nature of their legal systems. The flexibility of the
case law, the existing equitable doctrines, and trust and fiduciary du-
ties, all aid the practice of securitization. 4 ' By contrast, the "securi-
tization structure has presented problems in civil law based countries,
where the concept of trust law has traditionally not existed."4 These
countries have to enact special legislation to accommodate securitiza-
42 See id. at 247; Patricia Costa, C. Tyler Curtis & Jay R. Field, An Analysis of
the Chinese Banking Sector Post WTO Accession, 9-10 (2006), available at http://
www.umich.edu/-ipolicy/china/2)%20An%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Chinese%2
OBanking%2OSector,%2OPost%20WTO%20Acces.pdf.
43 See Ye, supra note 19.
44 See Shanghai Far East Credit Rating Co., Ltd, The New Trend of Housing Fi-
nancing Regime Innovation in China-The Securitization of Housing-Mortgaged
Loans, http://www.fareast-cr.com/ydzxe/jcyj/jcyj.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
45 See HONG, supra note 4, at 35-36.
46 See Timothy C. Leixner, Securitization of Financial Assets, available at http:/!
www.hklaw.com/Publications/OtherPublication.asp?ArticleID=41.
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tion including adopting "legislation to permit the limited use of trusts
(Argentina and Brazil) or [creating] special purpose corporations to
serve the same purpose (France)."4 7 In addition, there is "a lack of ex-
perienced underwriters, trustees and attorneys" in civil law coun-
tries.4" Consequently, securitization in civil law countries, including
mature markets, is underdeveloped in comparison to common law
countries.4 9
China is a civil law country, and presently, a country thriving
more on practice than on law.5" Developing a favourable legal envi-
ronment therefore, is a crucial step if securitization is going to be suc-
cessfully implemented.5 ' China has made a good start in creating a
legal framework for securitization. Since April 2005, China has en-
acted the Administrative Measures on Pilot Projects of Credit Assets
Securitisation (promulgated by the PBOC and the CBRC), the Provi-
sions on Accounting Rules for Pilot Projects of Credit Assets Securitisa-
tion (Promulgated by the Ministry of Finance), the Rules for the
Information Disclosure of Asset Backed Securitization (promulgated by
BPOC), and the Regulatory Measures on Financial Institutions Under-
taking Credit Assets Securitization (promulgated by CBRC).5 2 The
above regulations provide answers to fundamental questions relating
to how the securitization scheme will work in China. However, more
efforts are required in order to develop a mature legal regime for




49 See GAO, supra note 16, at 13.
50 See Vinod Kothari, Will China Remain Limited to NPL Securitisations, Even as
Massive Opportunities Knock at the Door?, available at http://www.vinodkothari.
com/secnews804.htm#china securitisation.
51 Nicholas J. Faleris, Cross-Border Securitized Transactions: The Missing Link in
Establishing a Viable Chinese Securitization Market, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
201, 206-09 (2005).
52 PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA - CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION, Adminis-
trative Measures on Pilot Projects of Credit Assets Securitisation, Announcement
No. 7 (2005); Provisions on Accounting Rules for Pilot Projects of Credit Assets
Securitisation, May 16, 2005; PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA - CHINA BANKING REGULA-
TORY COMMISSION, Rules for the Information Disclosure of Asset Backed Securitiza-
tion, Announcement No. 14 (2005); Regulatory Measures on Financial Institutions
Undertaking Credit Assets Securitization, November 7, 2005.
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* Who can be the originator of asset-backed securitization?
The newly enacted law clarifies that only financial institutions
can securitize their assets.5 3 It is therefore more appropriate to ad-
dress an SPV special purpose trust (SPT). The trustee may be an in-
vestment and trust company or a trust institution approved by the
CBRC.5 4 Other forms of business structures are not permitted to be-
come an SPV.
By contrast, in the United States, an SPV can take the form of
a limited liability company newly created for a specific purpose, a
trust, or an existing corporation.5 5 Although Chinese securitization
law does not expressly prohibit a company from becoming an SPV; the
current requirements in the Chinese Company Law prevent it. Ac-
cording to the Company Law, a limited liability company should have
at least RMB 30,000 registered capital, and a joint stock company
must have at least RMB 5,000,000.56 Chinese law also stipulates that
the issuance of debentures or bonds requires the net assets of a limited
liability company be at least RMB 60,000,000, while the cumulative
value of debentures or bonds must not exceed 40% of the company's
net assets. 57 Such a high threshold simply forbids companies from act-
ing as an SPV. Unless the Company Law is modified, any inquiry into
the feasibility or rationality of allowing companies to act as SPVs
would be inconsequential.
* Will securitized assets be subject to credit rating, and how
should credit enhancement be achieved?
In the United States, all asset-backed securitizations are rated
by an independent rating agency. Rating agencies are private compa-
nies that assess the risks associated with the full and timely payment
of the debt securities.5" In securitizations, the rating agencies play an
even more active role by assisting in structuring the transaction. For
instance, they may require structural changes, dictate some of the re-
quired arrangements, and mandate changes in servicing procedures.5 9
53 See PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA - CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION, Ad-
ministrative Measures on Pilot Projects of Credit Assets Securitisation, Announce-
ment No. 7, art. 2 (2005).
54 Id. at art. 16.
55 Jian Wang, What China Can Learn from US Securitization, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Jan. 2006, 2, available at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/article/010106IFLR
Wang.pdf.
56 Company Law (P.R.C.) (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 26, 81.57 Wang, supra note 55, at 3.
58 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6.
59 See Leixner, supra note 46, at 4.
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They also help the SPV to determine the "optimal credit enhancement
levels" for the securitized securities. 60 Investors make investment de-
cisions by relying on the rating given by the rating agency, and also by
reference to the reputation of the rating agency.61 A high rating means
a low credit risk to investors. Highly rated securities are thus more
attractive to investors, even when they pay a lower interest rate on the
securities.6 2
Chinese law has incorporated the practice of credit ratings and
credit enhancement. Article 35 of the Administrative Rules for Pilot
Securitization of Credit Assets states that securitized assets are sub-
ject to mandatory and continuous credit rating. Article 34 stipulates
that the credit rating of asset-backed securities may be enhanced
through internal or external credit enhancement.
* How can the SPT's insolvency/bankruptcy remoteness be
achieved?
Recognition of the insolvency-remote nature of the SPV (in
China's case, the SPT) is fundamental in any form of securitization.
The insolvency remoteness is achieved by "true sale," where the assets
transferred to the SPV/SPT from the originator are viewed as a sale.63
In other words, arrangements should be made to ensure that the as-
sets are protected from the claims of creditors of the originator in the
event of insolvency.
Chinese law has shifted to facilitate the concepts of true sale
and insolvency remoteness of the SPT. This is made possible by the
creation of a trust deed between the originator and the trustee. The
trust deed must specify certain matters including, the purpose of the
trust, the rights and obligations of the originator and the trustee, the
means by which the beneficiaries obtain their trust benefits, and the
scope, type, criteria and status of the trust assets. 64 The law has intro-
duced a double guaranteeing mechanism of true sale - the buyback
provision in the trust contract. If the assets transferred to the trust do
not conform to the trust deed in terms of scope, type, standards or sta-
tus as agreed in the trust deed, the trustee may require the originator
60 Sunil Ganwani, MBS Structuring: Concepts and Techniques, SECURITIZATION
CONDUIT, 1998, at 26, available at http://www.vinodkothari.com/gangwani.pdf.
61 The highest-reputation rating agencies are Standard & Poor's Ratings Services,
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., and Fitch Investors Service, Inc. Schwarcz, supra
note 61, at 6-7.
62 Id. at 8.
63 See Cowan, supra note 13, at 4.
64 Administrative Rules for Pilot Securitization of Credit Assets (jointly promul-
gated by the People's Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commis-
sion), Apr. 20, 2005, art. 13 (P.R.C.).
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to buy back or replace the underlying credit assets.65 Furthermore, the
Administrative Measures on Pilot Projects of Credit Assets Securitisa-
tion requires the assets transferred to the trust from the originator be
independent of the originator, the trustee, the loan servicers, the fund
custodians, securities registration and depositary institutions and
other institutions rendering services for securitization transactions.6 6
* Who are the investors or beneficiaries of the SPT?
The law specifies that investors or beneficiaries of the SPT
must be institutional investors." However, the law itself does not de-
fine institutional investors. Readers may understand the term accord-
ing to its ordinary meaning or usage in business and commerce.
An asset-backed securitization requires a number of steps.
First, the originator should create a pool of credit assets and set up a
SPT.68 Second, the credit assets must be transferred into the SPT, and
the trustee should be appointed, which is usually a trust and invest-
ment company. 69 Third, a trust contract should be executed between
the originator and the trustee, specifying the rights and obligations of
both parties, the trust terms, the method of managing the credit as-
sets, and the form and means whereby the beneficiaries are to receive
the benefits from the trust.7" Fourth, the trustee offers asset-backed
securities in the form of trust beneficiary certificates to institutional
investors. The PBOC will then, with reference to the law, the credit
rating report, the accounting opinion, and the legal opinion, determine
whether the trustee may offer the asset-backed securities on the na-
tional inter-bank bond market.7 Fifth, the income generated by the
assets will be used to pay returns on the asset-backed securities.7 2
This whole process should be under the supervision of the CBRC.73
Although the recent legislative efforts represent a break-
through in securitization law-making, certain ambiguities remain in
the law.
65 Id. at art. 14.
66 Id. at art. 6.
67 See Regulatory Measures on Financial Institutions Undertaking Credit Assets
Securitization, supra note 55, at arts. 3, 13; see also Administrative Measures on
Pilot Projects of Credit Assets Securitization, supra note 55, at art. 2
68 See Administrative Measures on Pilot Projects of Credit Assets Securitization,
supra note 52, at art. 2.
69 id.
70 Id. at arts. 2, 13.
71 Id. at art. 3.
72 Id. at art. 2.
73 Id. at art. 7.
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* Who is responsible for the credit rating?
The law states that credit ratings should be completed by
credit rating institutions with rating qualifications."4 The law also re-
quires credit rating institutions to ensure fairness and objectivity in
credit rating activities.75 However, the law does not specify the rating
qualifications of credit rating institutions. The only statement touch-
ing the issue is in Article 61 of the Regulatory Measures on Financial
Institutions Undertaking Credit Assets Securitization, which states
that the CBRC will take the professional capacity, rating methods, and
effects of the rating institution into account when deciding whether
the credit rating report can be relied upon in identifying the risks of a
securitization transaction. This gap in the law has resulted in some
uncertainties.
* How will the securitization law and the bankruptcy law be
reconciled?
The Chinese securitization law attempts to verify the insol-
vency and remoteness of the SPT by providing that the assets trans-
ferred into such a trust will not be affected by the bankruptcy of the
trustee, originator, administrator or other service providers.76 How-
ever, uncertainties still exist due to provisions in the Bankruptcy Law.
For instance, the Bankruptcy Law states that a transaction at an un-
dervaluation by an institution that later becomes insolvent is void if it
was entered into six months prior to the court's acceptance of the insol-
vency petition. 77 Before the issue of pricing securitized assets is fur-
ther addressed by law, uncertainties associated with the SPT's
insolvency remoteness should be rectified.
* What is the taxation implication?
The current law refers tax issues to future legislation. Hence,
uncertainties remain since future law development has to be taken
into account in credit asset-backed securitization.
74 Id. at art 35.
75 Id.
76 Id. at art. 6 ("In the event of the liquidation of the originators, trustees, loan
servicers, fund custodians, securities registration and depositary institutions and
other institutions rendering services for securitization transactions resulting from
their dissolution, revocation or bankruptcy under law, the trust assets shall not be
included in their liquidated property.").
77 See Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 35 (promulgated by
the P.R.C. President, Dec 2, 1986) as reprinted in LAws OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 295 (rev. vol. 1983-1986).
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* What is the scope of "credit assets"?
The term credit assets is not clearly defined. It is uncertain to
what extent various types of receivables are included.
In summary, the enactment of securitization laws has received
widespread support in China and overseas. Although detailed regula-
tions are needed, the introduction of the legal framework for asset-
backed securitization is a very good starting point. Skeptics question-
ing the outcome of the government's strategic use of securitization in
economic reforms. The law itself, however, has received much less crit-
icism. This indicates the increasing maturity of law-making in China,
particularly in the area of commercial law. Nevertheless, the Chinese
securitization law is far from complete and mature. Whether the law
will lead to an efficient securitization market in China is not yet evi-
dent, and the past experiences in China have shown that a good legal
system does not necessarily guarantee a successful practice.
IV. SECURITIZATION AND THE FUTURE REFORMS OF
CHINA'S BANKING SECTOR
To ensure the healthy development of securitization, China
needs to nurture a favorable environment for the practice. The experi-
ence of mature markets demonstrate that governmental guidance and
support are crucial to the success of securitization schemes, particu-
larly at the initial stages. For example, in the U.S., when securitiza-
tion was at its developmental stage, the government played a key role
in promoting securitization. The support was offered mainly in three
aspects: institutional, regulatory, and credibility.
Institutional support
In 1934, the U.S. Congress established the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) to provide home loan insurance to private finan-
cial institutions. The establishment of the FHA stimulated the home
loan business of private financial institutions and reduced the risk of
default on home loans.7" In 1938, the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation (FNMA) was established to foster a secondary market for home
mortgages. Its main business was purchasing the pooled home mort-
gages insured by the FHA in order to supply sufficient capital to the
FHA.7 9
In 1968, the FNMA was divided into two institutions, the
FNMA and the Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA). s 0 After the division, the FNMA became a quasi-government
agency, whilst the GNMA remained a government agency performing
78 See GAO, supra note 16, at 40.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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the functions of the previous FNMA. After the division, the FNMA fo-
cused on developing the secondary market for home mortgages, while
the GNMA's business was limited to guaranteeing home mortgages.81
In 1970, the U.S. government established the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), a quasi-government agency,
engaged in purchasing home mortgages and issuing securitized bonds
backed by the home mortgages. The mortgage backed bonds issued
and insured by the above agencies enjoyed the highest rating and li-
quidity on the secondary market of home mortgages.8 2 An important
reason for this was that such bonds were backed by full faith and
credit of either government agencies or quasi-government agencies.
These early bonds took the form of single-class mortgage pass
throughs 8 3 Soon, new species of securitization, including mortgage
backed securitization and asset-backed securitization, were
introduced. 4
Regulatory Support
The U.S. government introduced a number of rules and regula-
tory guidelines to standardize the practice of securitization 5" As a re-
sult, the standardization and efficiency of the securitization market
was quickly realized. Without government intervention, the market
would have taken much longer to become well-ordered and standard-
ized. The U.S. government also encouraged securitization by introduc-
ing favorable taxation and accounting policies, as well as removing
legal barriers.8 6 With such regulatory support, the securitization mar-
ket developed robustly.
* Credibility
Credibility is the foundation of securitization s7 The initial suc-
cess of securitization in the U.S. was largely a result of the govern-
ment's efforts to enhance the credibility of securitized bonds. In other
words, the guarantee and insurance provided by those U.S. govern-
81 Id. at 4.
82 Gangwani, supra note 15, at 1.
83 Id. 'at 2.
84 Id.
85 For instance, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles; Regulatory Account-
ing Principles; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Re-
porting by Transferors for Transfers of Receivables with Recourse; and Capital
Maintenance: Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and
Residual Interests in Asset Securitization, etc.
86 For example, securitized bonds are treated as non-risk securities and therefore
can be freely purchased by financial institutions. The interest is non-taxable or tax
deductible.
87 See Tim Nicolle, Introduction to Securitization, http://www.vinodkothari.com/
nicolle.htm.
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ment and quasi-government agencies greatly improved the credibility
of the securitized bonds. It also strengthened investors' confidence in
the securities, drawing investors to the market.
Other mature markets have followed the same path.s" The
practice in their systems unexceptionally proves that government gui-
dance is essential in promoting securitization. The experiences of
these markets provide rich sources from which China can draw
inspiration.
China's market economy has evolved from a planned economy,
with the government playing the key role in organizing finance and
productivity. The Chinese government consistently intervened into ec-
onomic activities, and thus is in an advantageous position to promote
securitization by exerting its intervening power. However, governmen-
tal intervention must be carefully oriented and controlled. After all,
the object of governmental intervention is to build a securitization
market. Once the market comes into existence and gradually grows
into maturity, the government should leave the market to be regulated
by market rules. Hence governmental intervention should be limited
to introducing and enhancing market mechanisms, and building and
perfecting the legal infrastructure. At present, the priority of the Chi-
nese government should be to improve the standardization of securi-
tization, accelerate the development of a legal framework, and
enhance law enforcement.
China has a specific agenda in securitization. The goal of im-
prove the economic performance and efficiency of its commercial banks
by securitizing their non-performing loans. The uniqueness of China's
case is that securitization in China is a historic duty of facilitating the
country's economic reforms. The economic reforms come at a crucial
stage. Corporatization brings new problems, and has not elevated the
economic performance of state-owned enterprises to the expected and
desired level.8 9 The government faces a dilemma of whether to priva-
tize these state-owned enterprises or continue to subsidize them. Mas-
sive privatization of industrial firms means social, political and
economic instability, as well as losing national industries to foreign
predators. However, continuing to subsidize these firms will drag
state banks into bankruptcy, which will eventually drive the whole
economy into the abyss. Any device that enables the enterprises to find
88 Since the 1980s, securitization was introduced in some first world European
countries including France, Germany and the UK, as well as some Asian countries
and emerging economies including Japan and Korea. The governments of these
countries took the initiative in the process. HONG, supra note 4, at 39, 277.
89 See generally H.G. Broadman, China's Membership in the WTO and Enterprise
Reform: The Challenges for Accession and Beyond, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/paper.taf?abstractlid=223010.
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other financial resources, therefore relieving the government of having
to choose between the two undesirable alternatives, would be heartily
embraced. The development of the stock market is an example.
The development of the stock market in China has, to a certain
extent, eased capital shortage suffered by some companies by provid-
ing a new channel from which they can raise funds. However, many
companies do not benefit from the stock market. The shares of wholly
state-owned companies are not tradable.9 ° The shares in partly state-
owned companies are divided into state shares, legal person shares,
and ordinary shares. State shares cannot be traded and legal person
shares can only be transferred among legal persons (an incorporated
body with an independent personality).91 Only ordinary shares, ac-
counting for a small portion of the total shares of such companies, are
freely transferable.92 The scarcity of tradable shares results in price
distortion on the stock market.93 Companies regard the stock market
as a place where they can enjoy the great liberty of absorbing capital.94
Instead of enhancing performance, many companies pursue short-term
benefits. Violations of listing rules and securities regulations happens
frequently, and investors have lost their confidence in the market. 95
The combination of macro and micro economic factors, including price
distortion and market irregularities, led the securities market into re-
cession.96 Since the end of 2001, the market has not been in good
shape.97 With the stock market experiencing years of depression, the
pressure on China's commercial banks has remained. The banks con-
tinue to lend to industrial firms and to be encumbered by non-perform-
ing loans. Securitization seems to be one of the last resorts for tackling
this problem.
Unfortunately, it has become clear that China needs to find a
solution to its economic problems within the immediate future, since
foreign banks will be competing with Chinese banks on equal terms
very soon. If securitization is reduced to another method of short-term
relief, the consequences could be fatal, since fierce competition will not
allow the Chinese to benefit from the use of trial and error tactics, as it
has used previously.
90 See BAISAN XIE, CHINA'S SECURITIES MARKET 62.
91 See CHENGXI YAO, STOCK MARKET AND FUTURES MARKET IN THE PEOPLE'S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA 3-37 (1998).
92 Id.
93 See Yuwa Wei, Volatility of China's Securities Market and Corporate Govern-
ance, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL L. REV. 224, 224-225; XIE, supra note 90, at 62.
94 See XIE, supra note 90, at 197.
95 See Wei, supra note 93, at 214.
96 Id. at 213-14.
97 Id. at 208.
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Thus, China needs to utilize the adopted strategy wisely.
Securitization should aim at uprooting non-performing loans, not
merely securitizing and selling the bad loans accumulated in the past
years. It is high time to prevent issuing loans that are likely to turn
into non-performing loans. Securitization can be used to achieve this
purpose. This is because securitization is a way of breaking off the con-
sanguineous relationship between the state banks and the state indus-
trial firms. Once the credit loans are sold to a SPT, securitized, and
eventually purchased by investors, industrial firms are under in-
creased pressure to repay the debts or face the real threat of compul-
sory liquidation.9" Furthermore, because securitized assets are rated,
and their ratings are exposed to the market and investors, banks are
under enhanced supervision when making loans. This stimulates Chi-
nese commercial banks to improve their management and governance
in order to reduce imprudent lending decisions, which will ultimately
reduce the number of non-performing loans. 9 9
Some suggest that non-performing loans are not suitable for
securitization, since they offer limited inducement to investors. It is
also expensive to enhance the credibility of such loans by way of insur-
ance or guarantee. In fact, not all non-performing loans are lost loans.
In China, non-performing loans are classified into five categories.
Some borrowers may only delay the repayments of loans; they are not
necessarily unable to repay the debts permanently. 10 0 Hence, in
China, there is a reasonable prospect of controlling non-performing
loans by securitization.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the last few decades, the financial sector has become an
increasingly important part in all economies, particularly those of the
developed world. Increased commercialization has prompted the finan-
cial market to innovate. New mechanisms of raising capital have been
introduced, and financial products have become increasingly diversi-
fied. Securitization as a new form of structured finance has developed
rapidly and spread widely into Europe, Latin America and Southeast
Asia, with the worldwide securitization market estimated to be in ex-
cess of $4 trillion. 10 1 Constant innovations make the securitization
market increasingly complex.' 0 2 Regulation has developed to counter-
act this increasing complexity.
98 See GAo, supra note 16, at 161.
99 Id. at 162.
100 Id. at 164.
101 See Leixner, supra note 46.
102 See Gangwani, supra note 60, at 26.
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With the deepening of its economic reforms, China's economy is
fast integrating into the world economy. Developing a securitization
market has been on China's agenda since the 1990s.103 The introduc-
tion of securitization and the pilot projects are the result of years of
careful consideration. Securitization is expected to aid Chinese banks'
efforts to improve business efficiency, increase their liquidity and,
most importantly, reduce their non-performing loans to a reasonable
level.
China has established a supportive legal framework. The law,
though requiring further clarification and improvement, is well-de-
signed overall. However, the regulatory work is far from sufficient, and
advanced legal infrastructure is needed to accommodate securitiza-
tion. China needs to enhance the disciplinary power of the market au-
thority, and improve market transparency by codifying disclosure
requirements. Furthermore, it needs to accelerate the making and
modification of relevant laws including taxation law, bankruptcy law,
and trust law to allow investors to benefit from securitization
transactions.
China has solid foundations for securitization. More than
twenty years' development of the stock exchange has resulted in the
existence of a large group of investors and increasingly professional-
ized intermediary institutions. Moreover, the government is deter-
mined to further the implementation of securitization. Hence,
securitization is a promising opportunity. It will be interesting to see
how securitization unfolds in China in the years to come.
103 See HONG, supra note 4, at 229.
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